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Cost/Benefit of Litigation in Fishery Management
Ten Years 'After the Fall':
Litigation and Groundfish Recovery in New England
Peter Shelley
32
I want to ask this audience since we are in Phoenix whether there are
any people in the room who have not had any involvement in marine
fishery management issues? Okay, there are a couple here. Well, for those
newcomers, marine fisheries management is like being Alice in Wonder-
land, without the pills. So, you are certainly going to hear a lot of different
perspectives today.
I do not share a lot of Professor Hanna's conclusions about litigation
and fisheries management, at least not with respect to the influence that
litigation will have over the long-term. Part of my difference in perspective
has to do with the fact that I grew up with a different council system. I did
my time in the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC),
which I think is getting better, but nevertheless, supports a very different
perspectives on the role of litigation in fisheries management.
My comments are entitled "After the Fall." I must have been feeling
particularly grandiose when I thought of that title, but I wanted to give you
a brief context for it. I am an attorney and Vice President of the Conserva-
tion Law Foundation (CLF), which is a regional, non-profit environmental
advocacy group in New England. The first litigation we ever did as an
organization was in 1977 when we fought oil and gas drilling on Georges
Bank.33 Our co-plaintiffs and principal strategic partners in that litigation
were the fishermen of New England, particularly the Gloucester fisher-
men's wives, although others supported us as well.
In that litigation, we had common ground and the fishermen were very
important to CLF for two reasons. First, they clearly gave us legal standing
to go into court, because of the risk to their economic interests from the
proposed drilling. Second, they were important philosophical partners in
what CLF was trying to do, which was to define the sustainable, highest,
and best use for Georges Bank as a site fish production and fisheries.
Fighting to guarantee the real-world economic benefits from the fishery on
Georges Bank gave CLF's position a gravity that we could not have
brought to bear on our own as an environmental organization.
32. Attorney and a Vice President, Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), Rockland,
Maine. Mr. Shelley has also taught the Environmental Law Clinic at the University of
Maine School of Law. The Conservation Law Foundation filed the first lawsuit against
NMFS in 1991 concerning the New England groundfish fishery.
33. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979).
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That first litigation had fishermen and conservationists aligned. After
that case, we had a decade of continuing partnerships over coastal pollution
cases like the Boston Harbor case' and others where our fishermen allies
both provided us legal standing, as well as economic legitimacy for arguing
for the substantial public expenditures necessary for pollution control.
Then in 1991, we sued NMFS over fisheries management, and every-
thing changed. I liken that moment in time for CLF as "after the fall,"
because the management plan that was the subject of that litigation, both
at the time and in retrospect, reminds me of that fateful Biblical apple that
was offered by Eve. In this case, the offer was by NMFS, and it was a plan
that was so admittedly deficient on its own face that if this plan were to be
legal, any skullduggery in fisheries management would have been legal.
We took the bite on the NMFS apple. It is now ten years later, and I
wanted to reflect back on the results of that decision.
First, it is very easy to slip into the habit of taking a snapshot of the
fisheries management program at a particular time and extrapolating from
that moment to define the state of the problem. I think that is what
Professor Hanna has done with respect to her assessment of the role of
litigation. I am of the belief that human institutions, like the people who
invent them, go through developmental periods. At the point when CLF got
into the litigation in 1991, I think at best you could call NMFS an
adolescent, a kind of bumbling adolescent.
NMFS had been charged with major resource management responsibili-
ties by Congress in 1976, but other than a few industry lawsuits, the agency
and its programs had not met any real adult challenges until 1991,
particularly from the conservation side of the table. I think the conse-
quence of turning on the legal lights on NMFS in 1991 was to reveal
suspect agency practices, which were startling to a lot of people, including
Congress.
Our suit was not the first piece of litigation that involved the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. There were other endangered species challenges
that had been brought by the Center for Marine Conservation, Greenpeace,
and others that focused on endangered species. However, our suit was the
first suit that tried to look at the Magnuson-Stevens Act itself and
determine which statutory requirements in the Magunson-Stevens Act
actually had teeth.
After the lawsuit, the fishermen in our region hated us, virtually to a
person. The state fisheries commissioners who, in our region, are mostly
just spokespeople for the commercial fishing interests, also hated us.
34. CLF v. Metro Dist. Comm'n, No. 85-1614-MA, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18209 (D. Mass.
Mar. 27, 1984).
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Ironically, the only group that did not hate us, although we certainly did not
know it at the time, were the people we sued-NMFS. They loved us.
They fully recognized the terrible, declining stock situation in New
England. In fact, they had tried to stop overfishing in 1986 by threatening
to take over management from the NEFMC. For those of you not in marine
fishery management, you have never seen a structure like the council
system in any other area of federal resource management. The Magnuson-
Stevens Act is a very complex experiment in participatory management,
and I think the jury is still way out on whether it is successful.
NMFS was going to take over management from the NEFMC in 1986,
whereupon every member of our congressional delegation signed a letter,
which stated in so many words that if NMFS took over NEFMC, they
would never get through the next budget process intact. NMFS immedi-
ately backed off. After that point, NMFS looked for a lightning rod to take
the political heat for them, so that they could do what everyone knew had
to be done: cut back the fishing effort dramatically. As a result, our suit
was very timely from NMFS's perspective. To that extent, litigation serves
the very important role in fisheries management of insuring that NMFS
does what Congress intended it to do when it wrote the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.
I want to go through some of the non-economic costs and benefits
associated with litigation. A price was paid by litigating, and I will just
make some brief points. First, litigation under the Magnuson-Stevens Act
can rarely produce the sought-after result directly. Fisheries management
is not an arena where the government actually has the capacity to control
the people who are out on the water potentially doing the damage or
implementing the fishery management plan. As a result, we got a great
piece of paper from our litigation that outlined a good conceptual approach
to addressing the management problems that came up. This management
plan actually addressed the overfishing problem, but it was supported by
very little consensus in the regulated community. Those being regulated
did not agree that the management measures were necessary or proper. The
importance of this credibility problem cannot be overstated, as the fishing
community has an enormous capacity to sabotage management plans if they
do not believe in them at some fundamental level.
The second aspect of litigation in this area is that fishermen take
everything very personally. Unlike the steel industry or some other mature
industry, fisheries management is personal, and it is personal to the
scientists in NMFS as well. Again, going back to the developmental
theory, it is similar to dealing with an adolescent. They take it personally
when you try to tell them they cannot do something. A general lack of
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sophistication and their extreme reactions to challenges make fisheries
groups and NMFS very challenging parties to work with.
From the fisherman's perspective, they "own" the marine resources,
and have owned them for hundreds of years. Those are their fish. Again,
I am speaking of New England, and I am talking about marine resources.
Environmental groups are at best considered poachers in the minds of the
fishermen. Environmentalists are taking fish for some illegitimate public
purpose that has the effect of removing product from their boat.
The third point I would like to make is that litigation is very uncertain.
There are about one hundred and ten fishery management cases. A lot of
these cases have been brought by the conservation community, and many
have been brought by the fishing community. However, for both interest
groups, the Magnuson-Stevens Act is set up in a way that is very difficult
to attack. The amount of discretion that is vested in the agency is
enormous. The Magnuson-Stevens Act's purposes are contradictory. The
language is obscure. The only people who truly love fishery models are the
modelers themselves. Trying to get a judge to understand maximum
sustainable yield is virtually impossible. The Magnuson-Stevens Act
makes Clean Air Act litigation, which is considered to be among the most
complicated federal regulatory programs, look like simple nuisance cases.
People do not go into Magnuson-Stevens Act litigation lightly. There is a
built-in constraint against excessive or casual litigation created by the
complexity of the statute itself and the number of barriers that Congress has
fused into the statute.
The fourth point is that litigation does not target all the right parties.
NMFS does have the responsibility for some of its own fishery manage-
ment plans, but most of the management plans are developed by the
councils, and NMFS has the right to accept or reject those plans. NMFS
has the right and responsibility to take management planning over if the
council does not manage it appropriately. However, the federal agency is
always working with someone else's design and this de-centralized
approach is inherently important and fundamental to the structure of the
statute. NMFS cannot just do whatever they want to do. They have to
work through third parties, the fishery management councils.
Many of those third parties are dominated by people who are inherently
oriented toward the resource they are managing as an economic commod-
ity, either the fishermen on the council or the state fishery commissioners,
who primarily respond to the fishermen in their respective states. NMFS
has a broader public charge than just economic development, but it has to
figure out how to accomplish this broader set of objectives through council-
initiated plans.
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It would be wonderful to take the councils to court directly. Moreover,
it would be a very illuminating process for the councils to actually have to
do the legal paperwork themselves, to justify their decisions before ajudge,
and to have to produce the science that supposedly is behind some of the
cockamamie management decisions they make. How can an eighteen
percent likelihood of success in meeting statutory requirements in summer
flounder be an acceptable plan? That is lower than the odds of a coin toss!
In any event, it would be wonderful to be able to drag the councils into
court, but the statute is not set up that way. As a result, one of the things
all of us on the conservation side have to live with in the short-term is that
we may be weakening NMFS by litigating against them. Our strategy in
the long-term is worth it in our view, because better plans will be produced
and the rule of law will become more familiar in fisheries management.
But we know in the short-term we are undermining NMFS, because we
have to blame them, as they are the responsible agency that approves the
regulations based on the council's planning choices.
What about the litigation volume with one hundred and ten cases
currently pending against NMFS? Is that a big or small number? After all,
we are talking about an agency that has management authority over one of
the largest federal resources in area, covering the federal territorial sea and
exclusive economic zone. Maybe we should ask the U.S. Forest Service or
the Bureau of Land Management? I would think they would love to have
only one hundred and ten cases pending against them.
So what are some of the arguments in favor of litigation? First and
foremost in my mind, litigation produces power parity, which is critical in
the long run. Fisheries management involves the regulation of the
economic development of a publicly-owned resource that has many other
public interests attached to it beyond harvesting fish. Getting parity in the
decision-making process with respect to the resource means having power.
The only way the conservation community has to gain any power in the
currently biased system is to go to the courts.
Again, thinking about the tragedy of the commons model, successful
common property management requires mutual coercion, mutually agreed
upon. If there is a power differential between the interest groups, you never
can get to a planning process that produces the actual result of healthy
fisheries. As an aside to Professor Hanna, litigation may divert some
NMFS resources away from the day-to-day business of management, but
in New England these resources were not producing any management value
anyway, so the fact that they were being diverted into litigation really had
a pretty neutral outcome in terms of the fish. Consequently, I did not feel
bad about that particular diversion.
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There is a second reason to go to the courts, which is to obtain a proper
interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act itself. The courts are the
legitimate vehicle in the American democratic system for interpreting
statutes. Maybe the Constitution that set up this system of checks and
balances is not economically cost-effective or maybe there are high
transaction costs in the constitutional scheme, but the courts are still the
place that you go to have the law interpreted. Although the Magnuson-
Stevens Act has been in existence for more than thirty years, many of the
fundamental statutory provisions have never been interpreted by the one
body that is constitutionally empowered to do so. Courts are inevitably
going to be the interpreters of the law.
Third, litigation makes a point that no other approach can make, which
is that non-commercial interests have standing, as there are other public
interests in the ocean. Before conservation organizations began litigating
in New England, we were not welcome at the planning table. Our
comments were ignored. Actually, they are still ignored, and most of the
discussions center around allocations of fishing effort between groups of
fishermen.
We lost friendships because we brought the litigation, but I believe that
our relationships with fishermen now, ten years later, are much stronger
than they were before. Moreover, the relationships are more legitimate,
because they are not tactical alliances developed to fight a particular battle.
Now our relationships are more strategic in nature in that they are based on
an improved understanding of CLF's institutional common ground, which
contemplates sustainable fisheries, as well as pollution control. People now
know that they have to deal with us as equal partners in the fisheries
discussions. Relationships based on these understandings will produce
better results, both in and, preferably, outside of the court system.
The next point is that litigation produces cover for politically weak
agencies. NMFS has never successfully developed a political constituency
in Congress. Let me give you one example illustrating this fact. Represen-
tative Barney Frank (D -Ma.) scores one hundred percent every year on the
League of Conservation Voters ballot as an environmentalist. At the same
time, to my knowledge, Representative Frank has never supported one
single management plan that promoted fishery conservation in New
England. He opposes every serious effort to conserve fish. For some
reason, he thinks that fishermen, including the scallop fleet, which is a
pretty economically well-off group of businesses, are the "little guys" who
are getting pushed around by the bad federal agency and the fish-hugging
environmentalists. He is vitriolic toward conservationists in the press and,
at budget time with NMFS, I am sure he is miserable. Access to the courts
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to redress and re-balance injuries to unrepresented or underrepresented
interests is an American tradition. I do not feel bad about that.
The fifth reason to litigate is that litigation is newsworthy. Our
objective is to build a political constituency for a healthy ocean. That is
why the Conservation Law Foundation takes the positions it takes and does
the advocacy work it does. That is why foundations support sustainable
fishery management support groups like the CLF, and that is why we go to
court. We do not go to court just to win a motion or a case. We are trying
to build a political constituency for the ocean. The only news outlets that
cover council meetings are the Commercial Fisheries News and the
National Fisherman. Their coverage is pretty obscure, at a micro-level, and
uninteresting to most people. Bringing a lawsuit on the other hand
guarantees front page headlines. That placement and exposure gives the
conservation community an opportunity to explain to the American people,
who are incredibly ignorant about the marine system, about what actually
is going on in our oceans. Generating a newsworthy event gives us an
opportunity to educate the public.
And the last reason I would give you, and this is a pure ego statement,
because there are many other factors and players producing the result, is
that litigation works. If I had the chart of the groundfish stock status in
New England to reference here, the downward spiral, which was significant
for the years proceeding our lawsuit, came to a stop two years after our
lawsuit. Now all the stocks that were the subject of our litigation are
rebuilding at different biological rates, but they are all on positive inclines.
The scallop fishery, which was slowly going bankrupt in New England,
because of overharvesting, has reopened and is bringing in millions of
dollars of new revenues. This is a direct result of the closures that came
from the CLF lawsuit. Litigation works, and I am not one to knock
something that works in the world of fishery management that is otherwise
so fanciful.35
35. In December, 2001, federal district court Judge Gladys Kessler ruled that the NMFS
had violated the overfishing and bycatch provisions of the Sustainable Fisheries Act by
failing to implement Amendment 9 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP and to require
measures to track bycatch and bycatch mortality in New England goundfish fisherres. CLF
v. Evans, No. 00-2234 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2001).
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